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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ALAND. FRANDSEN,

Plaintiff Respondent,
vs.
GENE GERSTNER and ZELDA
GERSTNER, his wife,

Defendants and
Third Party PlaintiffsAppellants,

}

Case No. 12134

VS.

MT. OL Y:vIPlJS REAL TY, INC.,
a lJ tah corporation,

Third Party DefendantRespondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the
defendants, Gene and Zelda Gerstner, asking for the conVt>y an("(_. of property known as the Millcreek Inn to the plaintiff, and the defendants counterclaimed and also brought in
'\1t. Olympus Realty, Inc., as third party defendant, asserting
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the lia hili t v of J\I t. Olympus Realty, Inc., to the defendanh
for any n·covery by tlw plaintiff together with damages and
defendants denied the claim by Mt. Olympus for a real estate
comm1ss1011.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The case below was tried to a jury in the Third Judit:ial
District Court of Salt Lake County, Hon. '.\larcellus K. Snow
presiding. The lower court directed a verdict against appellants awarding plaintiff, Alan Frandsen specific performance of an agreement which the Court found to have been
entered into between the parties on June 3, 1969. The lower
court also directed a verdict in favor of third party defendant
Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc., for the sum of $1,230.00 representing a real estate commission. In addition, $1,000.00
attorneys fees and costs of court were awarded to plaintiff
and third party defendant.
Appellants filed timely motions to dismiss both the
complaint and the third party defendant counterclaim. As a
matter of law, all parties filed motions for directed verdicts.
A motion for new trial and to alter and amend judgment after
extensive argument was denied by the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the directed verdicts awarded
by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Alan D. Frandsen,
and the third party defendant, Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc., and
urge that appellants' motions for dismissal of plaintiff's com·
plaint and third party defendant's counterclaim be granted as
a matter of law. The counterclaim of appellants and ap·
pellants' third party complaint, should be remanded for fur·
ther proceedings.
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111 ti)(' alternative, the directed vndic·t,-; should be rc1ns<'d and the entire matter remanded to trial.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendants, Gene and Zelda Gerstner, purchased the
\lilkret'k Inn, which is the subject matter of this law suit, in
I 9S9, from L. D. Hudson under an Agreement of Sale
(R. 3S2; Ex. P-36). The Inn is located in Millcreek Canyon on
Fore st Service property for which a Special Use Permit has
been ii-isucd. From 1960, until the autumn of 1964, the defendants lived at the premises, converting a portion thereof
into their residence (R. 352). They also operated the premises as a rei'itaurant (R. 329-330, 353). In 1964, the defendants moved to California (R. 352). Numerous trips
were made hack to Utah in the ensuing years to operate and
take care of the Inn, including setting up its operation for
business, preparing it for winter, draining pipes and
other arrangements (R. 353).
At the time of trial, the defendants had approximately
$22,000.00 to $23,000.00 equity in the Millcreek Inn
(R. 354). The exact amount remaining to be paid to L. D.
Hudson under the Agreement of Sale was disputed during the
trial. (R. 124, 137, 240, 243, 292, 354; Ex. P-6, D-11,
D-15. D-22, D-38, D-49).
In 1965, the defendants listed the Inn for sale for
but were unsuccessful in selling it. (R. 353-354;
E\. D-3). In 1969, the defendants, who were residing in California at the time, det:ided to list the Inn for sale again, and
i11 so doing asked defendants', Gene Gerstner's, mother to
conlad a realtor. She contacted Ted A. Hultquist at Mt.
mpus Realty in Salt Lake City, Utah, the same agent with
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whom the Gcrstners had dealt before. A general Listinu

Agrcerrwnt was executed on !\fay 7, 1969, on behalf of the"
defendants Ly the mother, Mrs. E. F. Gerstner, with \It.
Olympus Realty, Inc. (Ex. P-1). A copy of this Listing
Agreement with Mt. Olympus was not supplied to the defendants themselves (R. 127). The listing price was $25,000.00
although the defendant testified that he gave instruetiom
that a price was not to be set, and Mrs. E. F. Gerstner testi
fied that sht'. mentioned her son's desire on this matter to Mr.
Hultquist (R. 387, 339). Mrs. Gerstner (the mother), signed
the card upon the request of \1r. Hultquist who put down a
figure and told her it didn't make any difference as it wa'
just a matter of form, but did not read it (R. 339).
Gene Gerstner testified that he did not talk to anyone
at Mt. Olympus Realty about the 1969 listing until he re·
turned a telephone call from Ted A. Hultquist about May 16.
1969, concerning an offer to purchase made by the Robert B.
Henrichsens (R. 356, 367). :\1r. Hultquist, in his testimon)
controverted this sequence, asserting that Gerstner had talked
to him prior to the time the listing was executed by the
defendant's mother (R. 114-116). The telephone bill in evi·
dence substantiated the May 16 date (R. 367; Ex. D-40).

In response to a telephone conversation with '.\Ir. Hult·
quist, the defendant sent a telegram setting terms on which
defendants were \villing to negotiate a transadion with the
Henrichsens confirming what had been said

011

the tele·

phone (R. 356; Ex. P-2). In this contemplated transaction.
the Henrichsens were to "pay off" the "mortgage" obligation
on the Inn in the sum of approximately $7,500.00, this
representing the obligation by the Gerstner's to l\lr. L. D.

1
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Hu<bo11 of Ph<wnix. Arizona, tmder th<' Agrt>ement of Sale
(E\. P-2). Th«' other terms are set forth in th<' Henrichsen
ind11ding particttlarly a discount arra11g1·rr1<·11t appellants had worked ottt with the owner
Hudson: "Buyer to pay off the 1st mtg. of $7,500 approx. to

lw paid to \'Ir. L. D. Hudson of Phoenix. Arizona." (Ex. P-2).
Foll<m ing this,

Gerstner testified that he had no other

contact with Ted Hultquist in the month of
1969,
although lie had attempted to contact him to determine
wlwtlwr or not the Henrichsens were going to complete the
transaction (R. 356-357).
On J1111e 2, 1969, the defendant received a telephone call
from a pnson who identified himself as John Hyde of l\lt.
Oly mp11s R<'alt) (R. 3.56). At first, Gerstner thought this was
corwerning the Henrichsen offer about which he had heard
nothing more (R. 3.56-357) .
.John Hyde told the defendant on the telephone that an
offer had been made to purchase the Millcreek Inn. He then
explained that a person whom he identified as Alan Frandsen,
offered to purchase the Inn with $3,000.00 down, $2,000.00
within .'30 days, assumption of L. D. Hudson's "mortgage"
and a mortgage to Gerstner on some rental property in Salt
Lake City, which property belonged to the proposed buyer
Although Mr. Hyde testified that he read the

(R.

entirt· rn11tents of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Pur('hase ovn the telephone, word for word, Gerstner's testimony was to the opposite, that nothing was read to him
(R. 150, 410). Thus, the defendant was not aware of an

Eanwst l\loney Receipt nor the alleged $.500.00 deposit of
earnest money.
Gerstner further testified that John Hyde indicated that
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he would have to respond by tekgram to this offrr within
hours, and was instructed to lw sure that in responding to
specify that the offer to which he was responding was giwn
on June 2 (R. 3.57-.'3.58). \Ir. Hvd<· dictated the lanlfuaaf
h

of the telegram, telling Gerstner to include in the

response that Gene Gerstner was to receive $3,000.00 dm111

with $2,000.00 at a later date, that the Luver was to assume
the "mortgage", and providc sorrw rental property as st'('llriti
(R. 3.58). Thc dcfcnclant, Gene Gerstner, having received

telephone call from '.\'Ir. Hyde while he was at work, \\'Cflt tu
his home and discussed it fmther with his wifr. Zelda
Gerstner (R. 3.58).
Gt•rstncr tried to reach .John Hyde that evening (.lune2)
bv tdcphone to discuss terms he had previously discussed
with Mr. Hultquist which were different than Hyde presented
but was u nsu ccessfu l, so he sent the telegram as requested
by Mr. Hyde basccl up on the belief that he could continue tu
discuss and revise the matter (R. 3.58-360; Ex. D-21). H;df
verified his number as 277-7227 which is shown on D-21
(R. 201-202). The telegram which was sent was spccificalh
addressed as follows: "John T. Hyde, J\lount Olympus Rt>alll

2901 East

South Salt Lake City lltah" (Ex. P-7). The

telegram was addressed and sent to John T. Hyde as Gerstner\
own agent, and was not addressed nor sent to the plaintiff
Alan Frandsen. The contents of the telegram

as follow':

"Offer made on .June 2 1969 by Allen D. Frandsen for Mill
Creek Inn is accepted terms $3,000 down $2,000

within

30 days assumption of L. D. Hudson mortgage and first
mortaaae
to
Gt'.rstner for $7,000
on buvcrs
rental
b b
•

property" (Ex. P-7). Frandsen testified that he was not in-

formed on June 3, 1969. of the telegram's existence. and did
not receive a copy of it for about a week (R. 300). Mr. Hyde
however, kstified that he called Frandsen after he had talked
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to

and told him of the telcgraphi(' term,; as modified

(R. I 7:2. 199).
After sending this telegram, defendant stated that he was
(R.
. .Mr. Gerstner testified that the reason for
distress was that the telegraphic terms in the night letter
did not truly represent the terms upon which he was willing
to sell. He was deeply troubled about losing the Millcreek Inn
as scrurity for any sale, the telegram having referred to other
unknown "rental property" (R. 3.58-361). Defendant, Gene
Gerstner, previously had received a letter from ;\Ir. L. D.
Hudson, also known as "Frenchy", from whom he bought the
Inn, indicating that if Hudson's interest would be bought out
entirely that he (Hudson) would sell his remaining "mortgage" interest for a lower price, being $7,500.00, thus in
essence giving a discount of approximately $1,200.00 (Ex.
R. 358-359). Gerstner testified that he had talked with
vlr. Hultquist of Mt. Olympus at length about this matter
\\hen considering an earlier offer made by the Henrichsens
(R. 359). The defendant testified that he wanted to take advantage of this discount, and wanted to communicate this
information to John Hyde. At this time nothing had been
said or firmed up as to the extensive personal property
inventory.

Gerstner set his alarm so that he could get to work early
thP next morning (R. 360). After spending an uneasy night,
Ger:;;tnn got to work early and testified that he placed a call
to John T. Hyde in Salt Lake City at about 7:30 in the
morning, California time (R. 360-361, 427; Ex. D-21). The
telt>phone bill of Gene Gerstner was introduced into evidence
in vrrification of a person-to-person telephone call having
b!'en placed and completed to Mt. Olympus on June 3, 1969
(Ex. D-21).
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On examination and ('fOSs-examination, John Hvdc did
not deny that the June 3 telephone call had been complrted.
and acknowledged that "it mi11;l1t have been" made (R. 172).
Hyde testified that the number of Mt. Olympus was
484-8808, that he examined exhibit D-21 that shows a June
3rd person to person call to 484-8808 in Salt Lake and when
asked if it was placed to him said, "I would imagine that it
was." (R. 200)

During the course of this telephone conversation on the
morning of June 3, I 969, Gerstner testified that he told
Hyde that he did not want to accept the purchaser's rental
property in Salt Lake City as security (R. 361). He wanted
the transaction set up so that he would have a security interest in the Millcreek Inn itself, and so that his security
interest would not be subject to that of L. D. Hudson
(R. 361-362). Gerstner wanted Hudson paid off entirely b]
the purchaser for $7,500.00 so that he (Gerstner) could get
benefit of th<" discount which L. D. Hudson was willing to
give for a complete buy out of his interest (R. 361-362: ,
Ex. D-39). Gerstner testified that in this conversation with
Hyde he wanted to make absolutely sure that Mr. Hudson
would be paid off, and that no one else but himself would
have an interest in the place as security as he wanted a
"first position" on the Millcreek Inn to protect his investment (R. 361-362).
Concerning this "first position", Gerstner testified that
he explained to Mr. Hyde on the phone that he wanted Mr.
Hudson bought out at the time of sale and not an assumption
of the "mortgage" so that Hudson wouldn't be able to make
any claims at all against Gerstner in the event of default h!
Frandsen. l\lr. Gerstner testified that Mr. Hyde indicated that
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fw ,,rndd transmit this information to Frandsen (R. 361).
It

11

a" abo agr('('d in this conversation that Gerstner personal-

11 11 otifd liav<' to takt-> care of prq1aring the inventorv of
11 1·r-011al properties in the Inn (R. 362).
RdnerH·t' to an invt'.ntory in the Earrwst \loney Receipt
was lo the effect that such an inventon was "to be attached
and made a part hereof" (Ex. P-6). However, the inventory
matkr

\\as

not mentioned over the phone on June 2, 1969,

and ''as not rderred to in the telegram of June 3, 1969
(R. '.3:17-:3:1B; Ex. P-7).
Cmwcrning the effect of the contemplated discount,
(;l'1A11n said

011

cross-examination that the discotrnt which

lw rk.-ired would not increase Frandsen\ proposed sale price
of S20 ..l00.00 (R. 406). If the Hudson interest was bought
011L

tlwn l<·ss of the proposed total purchase price would go

to L. D. lfodson, with more accruing to the benefit of appelin the sum of approximately $1,200.00 (Ex. D-43).

Lndn this agreement, the amount to be paid to L. D.
H11d.;011 would have been $7,500.00 instead of approximately
SB.78:-L46 (Ex. D-43).
( ;,'nc Gerstner testified that his telephone call on June

:3. 1%9. to John

Hyde

was

placed at approximately

?::lO a.rn., California time, which was shortly after his arrival
at l\ork (l{. 361, 427). Gerstner testified that during the
10 m,,· of this particular conwrsation, John Hyde told him
that lw had not ) et acted upon the telegram, that he had not
1 I'!

cont<ided Frandsen that day, and that when he contacted

tlw pfai11tiff lw would inform him of the instructions given by
llw d1·frndant over the telephorw (R. 361, 399-400). In his

\Ir. Hyde admitted that immediately after said
lw ma<le contact with Alan Frandsen to inform
hi111 of tfw tnms set forth b\ thf' defendant (R. 172, 199).
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After the <lisrnssion with John
de on J111w J. 1969.
the defrndant talked again with l\lr. Hyde to make sur!' that
arrangements would be in order before the defendanb ('amr
to Salt Lake City to review the closing documents (R. 36B
370). Also, after June 3, a girl who represented herself

a

secretary for Mt. Olympus called GPne Gerstner and

,

what the amount due and owing on the Hudson contract wa.':
the defendant not having his papers with him at the time of
this telephone call informed her that he did not have the pre
cise figures (R. 368). The defendant believed this to be an irrelevant request in that he already told Hyde that the Hudson

1

interest could be bought for $7,500.00 (R. 368). No writings
of any kind, including a copy of the listing and Earnest
Money Receipt were sent from the real estate agency to thr
defendants prior to the arrival of the defendants in Salt Lake
City (R. 369). Mr. Gerstner asked John Hyde on June 3 if
something shouldn't be prepared in writing as at this time
defendant had no knowledge of an Earnest Money Receipt
(R. 364). Later that week, as requested by John Hyde, the
defendants did send certain insuranl'.e papers with a cover ,
letter dated June 10, 1969, in which Gerstner stated, among
other things, that "The inventory I can prepare without murh
trouble when I arrive in Salt Lake" (Ex. D-10).
Based upon assurances that everything was in order fur
closing, but still not aware of any Earnest Money Rrceipt.
appellants travelled to Salt Lake City (R. 369-371, 403).
On J unP 16, 1969, Gene Gerstner went to the offices uf
Mt. Olympus RPalty in Salt Lake City. (R. 371-372). This
was one of two visits made to the real estate company. thr
other being the next day, June 17, 1969 (R. 371-375). The
defendants wanted to finallv see what was in writing not

11
Jia,i11g bt'cn kept dosely informed concerning the transaction
(I\. :H>9. :HI). On his visit:-: to the realty compan), defendant
Ct·rit· Cn;;trwr saw for the first time certain do('uments which
had !wen pn·pan·d and some of which had been signed by
the plaintiff Alan Frandsen (R. 371-373). These included a
Collateral Assignmt:nt of the '.Vlillcreek Inn, an in\Criton list and a Closing Statement (R. 371-373; Ex.
D-1 L D-12,
The Collatt:ral Assignment of the Millcreek
not provided for in the Earnest '.\loney Receipt and
[11 11
Offer to Purchast: executed by the plaintiff, Alan Frandsen,
b11t was substituted in place of the provision in the Earnest
}{e('(·ipt which provided a security interest in n:ntal
in Salt Lah City (Ex. P-6).

Tlw defendants refused to execute these documents
bcl'ause they did not contain the terms
by the defrndanb, and they so informed agents of Mt. Olympus. The
lt'rms not included were the L. D. Hudson "buy out", includi11g the 1wndit of a discount, thus giving to appellants a "first
on the l\lillcreek Inn property. Also, appellants did
not agrct· with the inventory which had not been prepared by
Company and then
them, hut rather by Mt. Olympus
signt'd bv the plaintiff (R. 371-375; Ex. D-24, D-13). Because
tlwre was no agreement on the material terms of this transadion. defendants did not sign any of the documents
pn·part'd. Tt>d Hultquist of Mt. Olympus Realty in his testi:-;tatcd that the defendants were to have the right to
rn I''\\ the dornments so that thPy could make a determination as to whether they were acceptable (R. 130-131). The
1
kfr11dants ddermined they were not acceptable.
On June 21, 1969, a letter was sent by Gene
to
l()hn T.
ck of l\1t. Olympus Realty pointing; out again that
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the do('11tnt·11ts did not met'! tlw ,.;pt·cifit·atio11,.; of tlii· di
frndants. i11<"l11ding tilt' a ...:,.;ntion of tlw ddcndanl" tl1at t\ 111 ,
instnwtions had not hcc11 folio\\ t•d
tlw re
t·ompa111
a11d that all 11egotiatio11s ,.;ho1tld cease (Ex. P-2.)). Tlim 1,
affirmative t'\ idcrH't' in tlw ret·ord to indi('ate that ddt>nda 11 t.
madc co11tad with L. D. H11dso11afterJ11rw 2l. l 9(19, and a·
a result of arrangements agreed 11po11 the di,.;('otrnt offn of t\J,
Hudson..- was open through tlw ,.;11mmn of 1<)(19 (R. ll2.L
Age11b of \It. Olympus Realty abo t'Olltadcd L. I>. Hud,1111
during the months of J11ly and :\ug11st (R. 1:15, 22(>. 221\.
2:14-255; Ex. D-14. D-15. l>-16. D-22). '1r. Hyde tt·,tifi1d
that at the time he contaclt•d \Ir. Hudso11 in J11l! that llf 11a·
not then acting in his
as an agent for tlw Cn,tnn·
(R. 228). 011 St·ptnnlwr 22. 1969. Terra l11t' .. the corporati1111
of which the plaintiff is tlw major stockholdn and prt',idt"lll
bought out the inten·st of L. D. Hudson in the \1 illcm·k \1111
for $7.800.00, thus receiving the lwnefit of' the di,t·ount
which had been arranged by appellants (R. 28B-289: fa
D-4).
Telephone co11tact seeking furtht'.r negotiatio11 of term,
was abo made between the dt·fcndant Gene Gnstner and thr
plaintiff on two occasion,.;. 0111· being
of 1969 and thr
otlwr in J
of 1970 (R. 2B6. 297, :396 ). There \\a" con·
flict in the
COIH't'rning the ('ontcnt of thc"c Jj,
cussions owr the tclq1horn· }wtwcen tlw plaintiff and tlw
defendant Grnc GerstnPr (R. :396). Tlw plaintiff and the
defendants
nevPr arrived at an a{rrt•enwnt a:' to tt·rn1,.; and a
.
complaint \\as fikd dalt'd August 22. 1969.
\\ ith the
filing of a lis pcnLkn,.; (R. 1).
.
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ARGl!\JENT
POl'.\T l
E\ lllF\CE \JllST BE CONSTRUED \JOST FA VORA.BLY

THE DEFENDANTS AND ALL CONTRO\ EHTEU FACTS FOUND IN THEIR FAVOR BECAUSE
()f TllE CHANTING OF DIRECTED VERDICTS BY THE
THl.\L C0l RT.
TO\\ \RDS

1

th(' trial court granted directed verdicts in favor of
the plaintiff and the third party defendant, the lower court
1nadl' no findings to

controvnted facts. However,

11 itl1 tlw granting of a directed verdict, this problem is
rcsoh1·d in that it is incumbent for a t'Ot1rt to "consider
1·1idrn('e i11 light most favorable to a party against whom
motion

din·dt'd and resolve <'very controverted facl in his

/urnr ... BoskoPich v. Utah Const. Co., ] 2:3 ll tah 387, 259
P.2rl 8H:'i.

(Emphasis added)

D1·fr11da11ts submit that all evidence and controverted

fort• a, sd forth in the Statement of the Facts, supra, and in
thl' \rg1111wnL infra, should be resolved in the light most
favorablt> to the defendants in arriving at legal conclusions.
In

doing, it is asserted that the granting of directed verdicts

11a, 1mpropn.

POINT II
\\ OFFER TO PURCHASE THE PREMISES KNOWN AS
TllL \llLLCREEK INN WAS NOT ACCEPTED ON JUNE 3,
1% 11. In THE FILING, POSTING, OR SENDING OF A
llU);f{ \\I BY THE DEFE:\TDANTS TO THEIR AGENT,
\IT UL) \IPUS REALTY, INC.
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A.

Acceptanct' of an offer must bt> communi!'ated llJ
the offrror to form a contract.

It is a well-<lefint>d rule of law that a bilateral contract
does not come into existence until there is a clear and un.
equivocal acceptance of terms which are then communicaterl
to the offeror. lJ ntil the offeror is informed of the acceptancr
of his offer, the off eree has tlw power of rejection and/or
counter-offer. Koepke Sayles & Co. v. Lustig et ux .. 283. p
458.
Although the District Court did not issue specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case, it appear,
from its Judgment that the Court made a finding that the
plaintiff, Alan Frandsen, made an offer to purchase what i,
known as the Millcreek Inn by the signing of an Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the deposit of
$500.00 with Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc. (Ex. P-6). It further
appears from the Judgment that the District Court concluded
that a contract came into existence on June 3, 1969, when a
telegram dated June 3, 1969, addressed to "John T. Hvde.
Mount Olumpus Realty, 2901 East 33 South Salt Lake Cit1
Utah" was sent from Fullerton, California, this sending bring
instantaneous "constructive"' or "imputed" notice of acceptance to the offeror not dependent upon receipt (R. 7j:
Ex. P-7).
The written judgment refrrs to a June 3 agreement.
although the Court mentioned a June 2 agreement in its oral
'
/-".;g<"'e/ Ii
ruling, the latter being the date Mr. Gerstner ·q • to estt'rn
Union (R. 454, 462).
The finding that this telegram was an irrevocable ac!'ept·
ance when it was "filed", "posted" or sent by Western linion
in Fullerton, California, l'.ontrovenes basic contract law.
well as that of agency. The act of filing or sending this trkgram did not actually, or "constructively" meet the funda-

15
11 1t·1Jlal !<-gal rt'q11irt'nw11t that tlw <l<'.('('ptatH'(' of an offt>r must
lw rn1n1111111i(·alt'd to tlw offrror. and 1111til ('omm1111i(·att'<l. tlH'
po\\('!' of rcj('ction a11d/or co1111ter-offrr n·:-;idcs with the
offt·n·<'. II
('lear thal tlw pmporlt'd Earrwst \loney Rt•t·(•ipt
uffn of llw plaintiff rcq11ircd a (·om11111nicated
i11
that llw H<T('ipt had lo lw sig11t'd
tlw sdlns. tints !wing a
hilatnal rnnlrad (Ex. P-6). With 110 t·omm11nicatio11 lo the
uffrrnr.
assc11l lo an offcr is
privak.
Tlw telegram was not addn·ssed nor st>nl lo lite plaintiffoffcror. Alan Frandsen. As supported by
and from
llH' fa<'t' of tlw ('xltibit itself. it is ab1111da11th dt·ar that the
t('legrarn of .I 11nc :). 1969. \\as addrt'sst'd and sent to ··.1 ohn

T. H' dt·"' al \It.
rnp11s Rt'alty in Salt Lah Cit). l: tali. On
\'\amination. John T. Hydt> was asked by his own co11nsel:
().
\ o \\ . I 'II show \ o 11 w It at' s IWI' 11 rn ark(' d
Exhibit 7 ·'P'" and ask you ,viwtlwr that
tdq!;rarn was received in your uffi('c as a
1Ts1tlt of your lt'lq>lwrw call tu \Ir.
\.

'r ,.,.,. sir.

<).

\o\\. this is

\.

lo you, is it not,
.I oh11 T. H) d1-, \It. Olymp11s Rt'alty'?
)

('S.

(R. 14.'1)

tlw addressee of this telegram was not the offrror,
\Ian ll. Fra11dscn. it follows that tlw ·'filing'' or t>vcn rcceipt
II\ lh dt· of tlw telegram was not "('onstrnctive" or "imp11tcd'" t·on1mu11icatio11 of an accq>tance to the offeror. Thus.
the fili11g of se11ding of this telegraphed
('011ld not bt'
1·orhtriwd as thc rH't't'ssan t·omn11111it·ation to the offrror of
a11 ;1<·t·t·pLmt·t· "o
to ('Otnpletc the formation of a valid
ri·al t'."la I,. t'Oll tract.
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B.

The "fili11g". "postirq.(· or S<'11ding of a tf'lcgram Irr
an agent of th<' offrree is not ("Omrn11nil'ation tu
the offeror.

John T. H) de, the addressee of th<' tdq!;rarn. along witlr
Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc .. was the sole and exclusiue agent o/
the defendants. Gene and Zdda Ccrstrwr, in this real Pstafr
transaction. It is a well recognized general proposition of la11
that a rf'al estate broker or agt·n L may ad as an agent onlr for
the party employing him. and ma) not scrvt• both
toa
transaction unless both parties arc made folly aware of tlw
dual service and specifically give their assent thereto. Olson 1.
Gaddis lm estmerzt Companv. HS ll tah 430,
P. 2d ?ll.
12 Am. ]ur. 2d, sec. 67. p. 821.
1

The n·quired singleness of pmpose of a real e"talt' agfnt
is well founded. It is a relationship whnein the principal and
agent should Le ablt> to discuss openly and frankly all aspcd>
of any purported real <'state transaction. Any hint in the la11
or otherwise to the effect that a real estate agent
in
fashion anything but the sole and exclusive agent for hi'
principal would haw a serious adverse effect upon real estatl'
agent-cli<>nt r<>lationships. One would be communicating with
his own agent at his peril, otherwise. The importance of tlii1
is underscored by the LI tah Suprcmt' Court in observing that
this is truly a "fiduciary" relationship:
But the relationship of real estate agent and dirnt
makes th<> sitt1ation quite diffrrcnt ...

Because of the specialized service the real estate
broker offers irz acting as an a[.!,enl for his client
there arises a fidllciar_y relationship bet ween the111 ...
A. L. Reese u. Thomas R. Harper, 8 l tah 2d 119.
329 P. 2d .+IO. (p. 122, ltah Report) (Empha' 1'
addt>d)
1
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Frotn tlw rt'cord. it is clear that \It. Ol.\mp11s Realty.
]IJ(' ..
tlw agent of tfw defendants. For instance, plaintiff
\L111
was himself questioned with regards to the

agrnc.' of \l t.
().

mpus:

,\m1. w<·n· thcv acting as your agt'nt rn

this Ir a 11 sa <"I io 11 ·(
\.

\ 11 . 0 I .' m p 11 s .(

().

\It. Olympus Really peopk. \\en· tlwy·(

\.

:\o.

Q.

Wnc tlwy acting for vou and

011 \'Oltr

bt'half(

A.

Thn

were acting on behalf of \Ir.

Gerstner. All I was trying to do was pur<'hasc a piece of property.
Q.

You didn't employ them as your agenU

A.

\Veil, no, because I wasn't going to pay
the commission. Th<-'y were - certainly
weren't being paid by n1t· as an agent.
(R. :)OH-309)
this testimony is that of John T. Hyde of :\It.

Ol.\mp11s:

().

Now, pnor to th<'. time \Ir. Frandsen
called \' 0 II on
phone did VOLi know
him·?

A.

No. sir.

().

Had any business dealings with

A.

Never had met the man.
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Q.

Had he ever represented you as a lawyPr?

A.

No, .-;ir.

Q.

And he was -

was he or was he not

merely a prospective buyer and someone
who had called in respect Io the advertisement?
A.

Yes, sir.
(R. 147-148, Emphasis added)

As further evidence of this agency relationship of .\It.
Olympus to the Gerstners are statements made throughout
the proceedings by Alan Bishop, co11nst>I for plaintiff and
third-party defendant. For instance, with regards to Ted
Hultquist, Bishop said: "Well, now, your Honor, I think that
Mr. Hultquist has already been established as Mr. Gerstner\
agent." (R. 125-126). Then he argued that Ken Prothero
could execute the Earnest Money Receipt on June 4, 1969.
because he was Gerstner's agent. (R. 163). He called attention
in other declarations to the court that the real estate com·
pany itself was indeed the agent for the defendants (R. 4.S8).
The evidence is patently clear and uncontroverted that
Mt. Olympus Realty including John T. Hyde was the sole and
exclusive agent of Gene and Zelda Gerstner to handle this
transaction. Even if there were a conflict in evidence, the
granting of a directed verdict impels the finding of this
agency relationship. Boskovich v. Utah Const., 123 Utah 387.
259 P. 2d 88.5.

In the case at bar, the telegram of June 3, 1969, sent to
the Gerstners' agent, "John T. Hyde, Mount Olympus
Realty,'' was a cummunication between principals and their
agent, a communication to their fiduciary. This was not in
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any senst· a communication to the other party to the transaction or to an agent of the other party. It follows that the
telegram, being sent to the agent of the Gerstners, was not at
the tinw of its "filing" or "posting" a "constructive" or
·'impukd" communication of acceptance to the offeror Alan

Frandsen to whom it was not addressed nor sent or to his

agrn t.
Decisions from other jurisdictions lend further support
to this proposition. In the case of Koepke Sayles & Co. v.
Lustig et ux., 283 Pac. 458, a purchaser signed an Earnest
Money Receipt and gave $500.00 to the sellers' agent as part
payment. thus making an offer to purchase. The sellers were
gi\en three days to accept. The sellers then signed the Earnest
\loney Receipt on September 12, 1928, this being within the
stipulated three day period. The real estate agents knew of
signing by the seller signifying acceptance. However,
no notice of this approval by the sellers was given to the
purd1al'er - offeror, and on September 14, 1928, the offeror
slopped payment on his $500.00 check and refused to cons11nunatc tlw agreement.

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held
that the buver could revoke his offer because an acceptance was not communicated to him within the three
"· Although the sellers signed the Earnest Money Receipt
which hud been left with their agent within the three day
pnio<L and this agent who had produced the buyers had

if'dgt' of this signing by the scllns, the agent's knowIPdge 11 a;; held not to be a communication imputed to the
k11011

tT,.;,

and hence no binding agreement:

The trial <'ourt concluded from the evidence that
the !lf>pellant was the agent of the owners of the
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prvpert y the respondent offered to purchase, not
the agent of the respondent, and that notice to it
of the approval of the offer by the owners was not
notice to the respondent.
appellant contends
that this conclusion is not justified by the evidence,
agruing "that the most that can be said is that (the
appellant) is a real estate broker representing both
parties to the transaction to bring them together
and make the deal." Rut, in our opinion, the trial
court correctly interpreted the legal relation of the
parties. The appellant was employed by the owners

to find a purchaser for the property. It sought out
the respondent for the purpose of selling the property to him. In dealing with the respondent its
interests were adverse to him; it was its purpose,
and it was its duty, to obtain from him as favorable
an offer for the property as it could. (p. 459)
(Emphasis added)

The Court continued:

There was, moreover, no agreement or otherwise by
which the respondent (buyer) agreed to pay the
appellant (broker) compensation for its services.
(p. 459) (Emphasis added)

The Koepke case, supra, is referred to in a 1970 decision
of the Supreme Court of Oregon, Sheedy v. Stall, 468 P.2d
529. In the Sheedy case, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court
recognizes that the seller's agent may accept notices from the
buyer for the seller, but cites the preceding Washington
decision stating that Koepke " ... held that the agent of

the seller of realty was not impliedly authorized by the buyer
to receive notice that the seller had accepted the buyer's
offer." (p ..531) (Emphasis added)

Another case applying these principles is Sokol v. Hill.
310 S.W. 2d 19, a Missouri decision. This case underscores
again the importance of communicating an acceptance to the
offeror with such communication being a necessary pre·
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requisite to thf-' formation of a valid and enforceable contract
The Court declares that communicating an acceptance from
the ofj'rree to his agent does not form a contract to bind thf'
0 ffrror, and thus impliedly supports the reasonable corollar)
that such would not be binding on the offeree, as there is no
('On tract.
All evidence in the record establishes that Mt. Olympus
Realty was not the agent in any way in this transaction for
;\Jan D. Frandsen prior to or on June 3, 1969. There is
nothing in the record, explicit or implicit to suggest that Mt.
Olympus or any of its agents had any commission to receive
notices on behalf of Mr. Frandsen from the Gerstners. The
evidfnce is to the contrary. To find that a contract came
into existence precisely at the time of "filing" or "posting"
of the telegram to John T. Hyde would grossly detract from
thP law of real estate agency. A principal would be put in a
wherein he acts at his peril in discussing matters or
giving directions to his agent, because when anything was
uttered to his own agent this would be instant "constructive"
rnmmunication to the offeror.
Cases which may hold that the "posting" of letters or
"filing" or "posting" of telegrams by an offeree is an acce ptancP of an offer at the time the telegram or letter is put
into the hands of the Post Office or telegraph company because such is "constructive" or "imputed" communication to
the offeror if the offer was by mail or telegram are not
applirable to the facts in this matter. These "posting" cases
are readily distinguishable in that the telegrams and letters
posted are dearly addressed directly to the offeror, or to an
agent of the offeror who is plainly and duly constituted as
tlw offeror's agent in response to an offer directly from the
offeror using a public or dual agent. Defendants submit that
their situation is materially different from these cases in that
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the Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc., was on June 3, 1969, their
agent, their fiduciary. The telegram sent by the Gerstners
subject to revocation or change after "filing" or "posting"
it was still a "private" communication. Changes after filino
e
would be valid as constituting amendments to instructions to
their agent. The trial courfs ruling was erroneous. Appellants
respectfully submit that to hold otherwise would derogate
from the law of contract, agency and the well-reasoned Ja11
which supports the sound public policy of allowing open.
frank and free discussion between a principal and real estate
agent.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAINTIFF DID NOT REACH
AGREEMENT ON TERMS TO FORM A CONTRACT.
It is accepted law that before a contract can be formed
there must be an unconditional agreement to all the material
provisions of the offer. Williams v. Espey,. 11 Utah 2d 317.
358 P_ 2d 903; Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194,
247 P. 2d 817.
A.

Defendant Gene Gerstner called John Hyde of Mt.
Olympus Realty on the morning of June 3, 1969,
to change information given in the telegram.
Gene Gerstner clearly testified that early on the morning
of June 3, 1969, he made a long distance telephone call to
John T. Hyde of Mt. Olympus Realty to give specific in·
structions pertaining to the transaction with the plaintiff.
Alan Frandsen (R. 357-363). John T. Hyde did not deny the
reception of this call.
On cross-examination, Hyde admitted that such a call
have been" made (R. 172). He further testified:
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Q.

Thank you. Now, Mr. Hyde, I'm interest·
ed in your refreshed recollection overnight. It is your definite recollection,
now, is it, that you talked to Mr. Gerstner on June the 3rd?

A.

It is not my definite recollection, no.

Q.

Well, what is your definite recollection?

A.

I don't know if it was the 3rd or the 5th,

Q.

What is the telephone number of Mt.
Olympus Realty?

A.

484-8808.

Q.

Have you examined the Exhibit that was
admitted into evidence yesterday as 21-D
that shows a person-to-person call from
California was placed to Mt. Olympus
Realty number 484-8808 on June the
3rd?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Now, was that call placed to you?

A.

I would imagine that it was. (R. 200)

as I stated.

Cross-examination of John Hyde concerning this call
continued:

Q.

Now, did you submit that as a counter
offer to Mr. Frandsen?

A.

Only verbally.

Q.

When did you submit it to Frandsen?

A.

After we had our telephone conversation
when he (Gerstner) stated that he wanted the rental property deleted from the
earnest money.
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Q.

That same date"(

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And did that same date, did Mr. Frandsen say that was fine?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

So, on June the 3rd, that very day, it was
known by Mr. Frandsen that the rental
property was out and the security on the
Millcreek Inn was in?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

That's June the 3rd, 1969?

A.

Insofar as I can remember the date, yes.
(R. 233-234) (Emphasis added)

The telephone bill of Mr. Gerstner was admitted into
evidence (Ex. D-21). This substantiated the testimony of Mr.
Gerstner that he had called Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc., on
June 3 and talked to John Hyde personally. This call wa'
placed right after the defendant got to work early in the
morning as the defendant testified he had been troubled
about the telegram and wanted to make certain as to the conditions of any transaction before transmittal of the contents
of the telegram (R. 360-361).

In light of Hyde's testimony, along with that of the defendant, there is no definite evidence contradicting the fact
that this call was made by Gerstner on June 3rd. Since the
trial court granted a directed verdict, any controversy as to
these facts, if any exists, should be resolved in favor of the
defendant. Boskovich v. Utah Const. Company, 123 Utah
387, 259 P. 2d 885.
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8.

The terms given by the defendant to John Hyde
over the telephone on June 3 were material in
nature, thus being a rejection of the plaintiff's
offer.

In this telephone conversation with his agent, John Hyde,
on June 3, 1969, the defendant gave explicit instructions
changing items mentioned in the telegram (R. 359-363). Mr.
Gerstner stated that he didn't want the Salt Lake rental property offered by the plaintiff as security for plaintiff's
payments (R. 361). The defendant clearly told Mr. Hyde at
this time that he wanted L. D. Hudson, to whom Gerstner
owed a balance on the Inn, paid off entirely and not over a
period of time by the plaintiff, thus getting Hudson completely out of the Millcreek Inn picture (R. 359-363). This
pay off was to be in the amount of $7,500.00 (R. 361, 390;

Ex. D-39).

As Gerstner explained to Hyde, he wanted the transaction arranged so that L. D. Hudson would be entirely paid
off so that only the defendants would have any kind of interest in the Inn property other than the proposed purchaser
(R. 361-362). The defendants, in other words, wanted a "first
position" from the standpoint of security (R. 362).
The Frandsen offer given over the telephone on June 2
to \fr. Gerstner provided for security in rental property of
the plaintiff located in Salt Lake City (Ex. P-6). The "offer"
also provided for the assumption of the "mortgage" of
Hudson, but not an immediate total buy out as requested by
Gt'rstner (Ex. P-6).
The defendant testified as to why these terms were
important tu him. He wanted protection so that he wouldn't
have to worry about Hudson if Frandsen defaulted on
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"mortgage" payments to Hudson because Hudson would br
out of the picture entirely (R. 361-363). Also, the defendani
would receive a discount of approximately 2 $1,200.00 a., a
benefit of this buy out of Hudson (R. 358-363; Ex. ]) .39.
D-43). On cross-examination, the defendant testified that th 1,
$1,200.00 discount would not increase the total pttrcha)r
price of $20,500.00 purportedly offered by Frandsen, but
that less of this total sale price would go to Hudson becausr
of the buy out discount, with more of the total price accruiuu
e
to the defendants (R. 405-406). This was due to the fact
that as set forth in a letter dated March 3, 1969, L. D. Hud
son, also known as "Frenchy", was willing to reduce the
"mortgage" amount owing by the defendants if his interest
would be bought out entirely (Ex. D-39). There is affirmative evidence that this discount offer of Hudson
open on June 2 and, in fact, continued to be open throughout
the summer of 1969 (R. 432).
Without question, these terms insisted upon by the
defendants were substantial and material. They went to the
heart of the entire transaction. Since an acceptance
unconditionally agree to all the material provisions of the
otter . . .", there was not acceptance by the defendants on
June 3, 1969, but a legal rejection and at most a counteroffer.
Williams v. Espey, supra; Daum v. Child, supra, at 202.
(Utah Report) (Emphasis added)
C.

Plaintiff Alan Frandsen was notified on June 3.
1969, concerning terms required by the defendant.
Gene Gerstner testified that when he talked to John
Hyde on the telephone on the morning of June 3, 1969. he
was definitely told by Mr. Hyde that Alan Frandsen had not
yet been contacted concerning contents of the telegram
by the defendant.
As the defendant stated on
examination:
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().

I

By lieing in order, you mean m

ordn the way you wanted and in strict

\aria nee with the offer you had ac-

cqitcd and the telegram you had

A.

111 strict conformance (with) my instructions on the morning of June the 3rd.

Q.

After 1\1 r. Frandsen had been informed
that his offer had been accepted?

A.

Not according to Mr. Hyde. He told me
he'd not been informed. (R. 399-400).

(Emphasis added)
The following was testimony of John Hyde:

Q.

I set'. And, in that conversation that you
had he did make it plain to you, that is
\Ir. Gerstner made it plain to you, that
this term in the telegram that he had sent
about the rental property was not acct>ptable?

A.

That is the only thing that was stipulated
at that time.

Q.

And that he had to have the first position
in 1'1ilkreek Inn for security, is that
correct'?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you tell Mr. Frandsen that?

A.

l certainly did after our telephone conversation I called Mr. Frandsen1 and told

him that Mr. Gerstner didn't want his

.
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rental
added)

172) (Emphasis

(R.

Cn,,ttHT tt'stifo'd that ht' called Hyd(' aro1111d 7::)0a. 1 ,
California timt' 011 June :{rd (R.
I, -i27). Thi,, \\a'/iru,
in tim<' to \\ h<'n Frands<'n said that H} d<' madt· a 1·all to 1111
on tht' same day indicating lw had hot1ght a rcstamant 11:
299-30J ). A.t rnw point in his t'ross-<'xamination, Frand,, 1
said that th<' st1h"ta11tT of this t'all was "moJT or les:-" tlial 11,
had liot1ght a tTsLrnrant (}{. 299-:H)l).
From thl' timt' of the t'alls, Gn:4tHT°s testirnoll\ tiidl
H} de told him on tilt' 3rd that lw hadn't t'ontad<'d Frand,1·1.
ahot1t tlw telegram, and Hyde's testimony that aftn l11i·
Cnstnn t·all lw (H) de) tlwn informed Frands<'n of cha11g1
int lw propost'd transaction, there shot1ld h<' a finding Of't·a11,,
of a directed verdict that 110 action had h<'cn takrn 011 tl11
kit-gram prior to
J uric 3rd
call. Tlwrt' .-;lwuld lw
a finding that Frandsen \\as timely informed of dia11g;e in tl11
transaction before any purported oral ae<'t'piatH'<' of tlw rk1i
was communicated h} \It. Olympm; to Frandsen.
EvPn if for some reason the evidence could
111
constnwd to find that Frandsen was infornwd
John
Hy dt' that he (Frandsen) had bought a restaurant, prior to th 1
Jww
call from Gnstncr, this oral acceptanct' '' 01ild 11 11 1
cr<'atc an enforceable contract for the reasons as
111
Points II, IV, V. VI and Vil. Tht' same is true if Hyd(' l!li·
inform<'d Frandsen c.ifter Gerstner·s call 011 tlic :hd as arg 11ni
in Points II. I\.\. \I and \II.

D.

No aan·cmcnt
on terms was reached and
.
cations, induding tdegram \\f'ft'
.

co111111u 111 .

part ul

egotia tio ns.
1n and of itself tlw telegram was not a valid a<:('('ptann
11
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J,ut \\as part of the negotiations. The defendant testified
1hal all of the contents of the
'.\loney Receipt \H'rt'
1 rTad to him over the telephone. It was not mentionr-d
110
, 111 the :{rd and he was not even informed concerning doc11nlt'lll" 111llil h<' came to Salt Lake City (R. 357-363. 364,

:\69-371. 410). Thus the telegram was not responsive by
rcfercnn· to the Earnest Money Receipt offer per se.
This is further substantiated by the fact that an important term such as inventory was not even mentioned in
the tr·legram which was sent to his agent. In fact, inventory
not mentioned at all to the defendants until the morning
of ] unc 3 when it was agreed over the telephone that the
defendants were to prepare the inventory

(R. 362).

Contrary to agreement, Mr. Hyde and his secretary prepm·d tlw inventory which was signed by the plaintiff (R. 175,

370. 37'.3-374). The defendant never saw a copy of this inventon until l\1r. Gerstner went to the office of Mt. Olympus on
June 16, 1969 (R. 362-363, 371, 373). It is clear that John

Hyde and the plaintiff, Alan Frandsen, both knew that there
had to be an agreement as to this inventory as underscored
by the following on cross-examination of John Hyde:

Q.

In any event you did remember the June
10th communication, Exhibit

10, in

which he made it plain he would prepare
the inventory personally in Salt Lake
City, is that right?

A.

He (Gerstner) sent two items if I recall
with the letter and stated that he would
come and check the inventory personally.

Q.

Well, ht> said the inventory I can prepare
without much trouble when I arrive in
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Salt Lakl'. That's what he said and vou
knew it, didn't

It's addrcssnl to

.vou. y OU f('ct'.ivcd it, did

VOii

"'

not"?

A.

Yes. sir. I received that.

Q.

Now, with respect to that mattn did

you tell lHr. Frandsen that this inventory
that you had prepared hadn't been accepted or gone over or approved by !llr.
Gerstner?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you told him that it was subject to
the approval of Afr. Gerstner?

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

So that it was not a complete transaction?

A.

So that th<' inventory was not.

Q.

Without approval?

A.

That's correct. (R. I 76-177)
(Emphasis added)

Inventory was not agreed upon (R. 373, ;399). Afkr
negotiations fell through in June and after being contarkri
by the plaintiff in July, the defendant sent a letter to Frand
sen setting forth in detail the inventory as he understood it.
to \\ hieh again there was no agreement (R. 399: Ex.
Whilt' attempting to be specific as to terms, the tclt>grani

R1•
1:t>ipl and inventory, but is siknt concerning the total pur
not onh fails to make reference to the Earnest

l'has1· price and the amount of the monthly payment, 111
the ddendants
the purchaser. Then· is nu rcfrn·11•' '"
111tnest or to the precise amount owing to L. n. Hudson ur t,,
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,hat type of contract is to be entered into (Ex. P-7). The in!'ompleteness of this telegram is further emphasized when
compared for instance to the one sent regarding the earlier
Hfnrichsen offer containing such terms. (R. 356; Ex. P-2).
1

When in Salt Lake City, the defendant discovered that
his instructions had not been followed on material terms
besides inventory (R. 372-375; Ex. D-23). For instance, in
the closing statement there was no provision taking into account the discount which would accrue to the sellers from
the buying out of L. D. Hudson by the purchaser (R. 373;
Ex. D-11). The Gerstners were not given a "first position" on
the Millcreek Inn as required.
As further evidence of the fact that negotiations were
,:till in progress and that no agreement had been reached is
the fact that a collateral assignment of the interest in the
\lillcreek Inn in favor of the defendants was prepared and
had been signed by the plaintiff (Ex. D-12). This was supposed to be in lieu of a security interest of the defendant in
property belonging to the plaintiff in Salt Lake City. This
action by the plaintiff was· a material departure from the
tt'rms of the Earnest Money Receipt even though it didn't
meet the requirements of the defendants (Ex. P-6).

It is submitted by the defendants that there was no
agreement as to terms. Furthermore, the telegram in and of
itself was not a valid acceptance as it was silent on so many
important terms and underscored by the lack of reference to
an Earn1·st Money Receipt of which defendants had no knowledge. The telegram was part of the negotiations, being a
communication to the agent of the sellers.
E.

The defendant had to execute the closing documents as a condition precedent to being bound to

the plaintiff.
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The
Gene Gerstner, was not made aware ul
the existence of the Earnest Money Receipt or the deposit 01
earnest money in discussions with l\It. Olympus un tft,
phone and didn't see any documents until lw came lo Sail
Lake on June 16, 1969 (R. 357-363, 364, 410). It 1111
derstandahle then that the telegram sent to their agent, Jolin
Hyde, was silent with regards to material terms in the Rccript.
such as inventory.
The defendant was very disturbed because he had seen
nothing in writing to tell him what was going on (R.
He asked John Hyde specifically on June 3 if some of the
things discussed shouldn't he reduced to writing, and \Ir.
Hyde indicated they would he taken care of although still
not mentioning an Earnest Money Receipt (R. 364). Thus.
not knowing of the Receipt, and assured of papers being prepared, the defendants did not believe that a binding agm·
ment would come into existence until they saw the closing
papers and approved them.
This is holstered by the testimony of Ted Hultquist
that the defendants had the right to review the papers pre·
pared to determine whether the deal was acceptable (R. 130132). When he arrived at the Mt. Olympus office, Gene
Gerstner asked if he had a right to look at the papers
(R. 371). His wife. testified that he went to the office h:
himself to get
papers and then bring them back for
review (R. 332).
As already set forth, the papers were not acceptabk.
For purposes of a directed verdict, it is asserted that thm j;
affirmative evidence that the closing papers had to he ap
proved as a condition precedent to the defendants being
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howid

lo lilt'

plaintiff in thi:-; particular transaction.

POINT IV
O'i Jl NE :L 1969, NO CONTRACT EXISTED AS THE
E \RNEST \JONEY RECEIPT WAS NOT SIGNED BY THE
flEFEND.\NTS AS CONTRACTUALLY REQUIRED.
1

Jn it:-; Order . th<-' trial court decreed:
That ddcndants are ordered to specifically perform
the agrremrnt entered into between the parties on
lune 3. 1969 and convey the property known as
\lillcrt>ek Inn ... (R. 7.5) (Emphasis added)
The rt>frrence to June 3, 1969, could not have been in
nror or through inadvertence since the matter was extensively

arg1wd and the facts relating to occurrences on June 4,
I % 1). hereinafter set forth, were called to the attention of
the Court (R. 462-463, 467, 471-472). The telegram sent by
the defrndants was not physically received and attached to
the Earnest Money Receipt by Mt. Olympus Realty until
June J., 1969 (R. 250-251). On this date, June 4, 1969, Mr.

Prothero wrote on the contract:
\cl't·pted as per terms of telegram a copy of which
attached hereto & by reference made a part
:lit. Olympus Realty. Ken Prothero - agent.
(Emphasi:-; added)
ln line 37 and 38 of the Earnest Money Receipt it is
-lated that this "offer is made subject to the written acicptan('e of the seller endorsed hereon . . . " (Ex. P-6). In
11

rdn for

tlir11.

tu be an acceptance of this particular offer

a condition, the sellers had to endorse the Receipt as
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even an oral acce1)tance is not binding if there had bt'('n
-- (Jiit

No subscription was done by the sellers or even purporkdli

for them on June 3, 1969; therefore, the

\Ionri

Receipt offer was not accepted and there was no agret>mi'Jil
to be enforced on June 3, 1969.
Even if the Earnest Money Receipt purportedly :iignru
for the defendants by l\lt. Olympus on June 4, J969, i1rrc
taken into consideration, there would he no binding agrrp
ment. As argued more extensively under part B of Point\_
infra, Mt. Olympus Realty had no authority to sign tli1
Earnest Money Receipt, which authority must be in 1Hiting.
Furthermore, instructions were given on June 3, 1969.
changing information in the telegram sent on that day.
POINT V
NO CONTRACT EXISTS WHICH MEETS THE REQUIRE
MENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

In order for a real estate contract to be enforceab!f

i11

the State of Utah and not absolutely void, important provisions of the Statute of Frauds must he strictly adhered to:

Every contract for the leasing for a longer period

than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or an)
interest ii{ lands, shall be void unless the contract.
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing

subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sole
is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
_
(Emphasis added) Utah Code Annotated, 1%3.
Sec 25-.S :3. (See also Utah Code Annotated, 195.3.
Sec. 25-5-1).
The Statute of Frauds was properly raised as a defense(K.1 2·

68).
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This Code section declares that any contract relating to
rl'alty is not just voidable, but is void unless two requirements
arr precisely met: (A) There must be a written contract or
mernorandum subscribed by the party who is making the sale;
(B) If an agent subscribes a document for and on behalf of
his principal, the agent must have specific authority in
11 riting from his principal to perform this function. Defendant
, 11 hmils that neither of these prerequisites for a valid and enforceable contract were met on June 3, 1969, or any other
daft'.

A.

No written contract or memorandum was subscribed by the defendants or their agents on June 3,

1969.
In order to enforce an agreement concerning the Millncek Inn against the sellers, the defendants must have signed
the contract or have had their agent execute on their behalf.
Lee v. Polyh rones, 5 7 Utah 401, 195 Pac. 201. As sub'tantiated in the Lee case, supra, the clear wording of Utah's
Statute of Frauds requires the vendor's or seller's name to be
on the contract to be enforceable against the
and to save the contract from being void. Utah Code.
Annotated, 1953, Sec. 25-5-1; 25-5-3.
The purported signing of the Earnest Money Receipt on
lwhalf of the defendants did not take place until June 4,
1969. one day after the date of the contract decreed by the
trial rourt to be specifically performed (R. 250-251 ). Therefore, a properly subscribed contract or memorandum did not
n1st on June 3, 1969, for purposes of the Statute of Frauds
11ith no evidence to the contrary.
B.

No written authority was given by the defendants
to \1t. Olympus Realty to execute any documents
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on tlwir behalf.
Even considering th<" Earnest Money Receipt cxec 11 tPa
on June 4 by l\1t. Olympus, there was no authority to do thii.

It is a general proposition of law that a real estate agent drw,
not have implied authorization to bind his principal to am
contract under an ordinary listing agreement. Mason et al. 1
Maze!, 187 P. 2d 98 (Calif.); Springer v. City Bank & Trust
Co., 149 Pac. 2.53 (Colo.). Authority given to an agent J)
limited to findi!1g a purchaser to meet the terms of the
seller and does not include a power of attorney to exer:u!I'
any documents. This rule applies whether or not a listing j,
exclusive. Mason, supra, at 98-99.
The listing agreement between the defendants and
Olympus Realty being the normal type of listing does not in
any way give to Mt. Olympus the right or power to sign am
writing, contract or document on behalf of the
(Ex. P-l). It is clearly the law that the use of the words"n
elusive right to sell ... " in a listing con tract of th is type j,
not tantamount to giving a right to actually subsr.:ribe an
instrument. Mason, supra; Springer, supra. Further, in tlw
listing, Exhibit P-1, authority other than the right of genml
listing to find a purchaser is spelled out specifically, such a,
the right to offer through the Multiple Listing Service and to
place a sign on the property besides that of executing
documents (Ex . .P-1), wherein it states that if a

j,

found meeting t.he terms of the seller that the seller is "tu
execute the necessary documents of conveyance ... " (Ex.

P-1) (Emphasis added)
The only other writing outside the general listing ar
rangement which could possibly be relied upon by \It.
Olympus for a power of attorney would be the tekgram pt
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Jllllt' ;),

1969 (Ex. P-7). However, even this telegram l'.ontains

f!olhi 11 g within its wording giving authority to

:'.\Ir. Prothero

or to i\lt. Olympus Realty to subscribe the Earnest l\loney
Rrrcipt on behalf of Gene and Zelda Gerstner.
As stated by the Court in Springer, supra, "It is settled
law that a contract of agency giving power to sell real estate is
to be strictly construed," and if there is any doubt as to
authority, it is to be "resolved against the agent" (p. 255)
(Emphasis added). Further support is given to this proposition
b) the California court in Mason v. Mazel,

that authorization for a real estate agent to execute for his
principal must be clearly and distinctly given (p. 100-101). A
realtor is not to assume any authority to bind his principal
nor to imply such is given until it is unequivocally set forth in
writing.
There is not one word in the telegram of June 3, 1969,
directing or authorizing Mt. Olympus to execute any binding
dorument, including the Earnest Money Receipt of which
the defendants had no knowledge and which is not referred
to in the telegram (R. 357-358, 410).
Even if, arguendo, the wording of the telegram were
construed so as to find a written authorization to
P\tcutc, such "authorization" was invalidated by the change
in directions given over the telephone, supra.
C.

No part performance was shown to take any agree-

ment out of the Statute of Frauds.
There is no evidence in the Record of part performance
to takr any agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.
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POINT VI
MT. OL Y\JPUS REAL TY EXCEEDED ITS AUTHOR!l
BY PURPORTEDLY BINDING THE DEFENDANTS 1
AN AGREE.VIENT WITH THE PLAINTIFF AND VIOLA
ED FIDUCIARY DUTIES.

Mt. Olympus Realty exceeded its authority b) pl
portedly binding the defendants to an agreemt
with the plaintiff.
As extensively argued under Point III of this Brief.
should factually be resolved that Gene Gerstner talked 1
John Hyde of Mt. Olympus Realty on the morning of Jw
3, 1969, and substantially and materially altered inforrnatiu
contained in a telegram sent to the defendants' agen
supra. A principal is entitled to amend or alter instructior
given to his agent and thus, the terms given over the tel1
phone to John Hyde by the defendant, Gene Gerstner, 11er
valid and should have been rigorously adhered to.
A.

Because of these instructions given by the defendan
over the telephone on June 3, 1969, before the telegram ha
been acted upon, it is patently clear that Mt. Olyrnpu
Realty had no authority to either orally accept any offer 0
June 3, or to purportedly subscribe the Earnest
Receipt on behalf of the sellers the next day on
1969. Mt. Olympus Realty is liable for damages resultin
therefrom.

B. Mt. Olympus Realty violated its fiduciary duties.
The defendants resided in California during the f'ntir
course of this matter with the plaintiff, Alan
(R. 352-353). Prior to June 16, 1969, defendants and
of Mt. Olympus Realty never met on a personal or fac
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basis r('latiff to this purportt'd transaction. '\It.
(ll\ 11 qi 11 , 11a' a11art' that ('Ommunications c·onC"nning th(' sale
,i1· 1lw \lillc-nTk Inn 11-otdd havt' to bt' conducted OVIT a grl'at
,,_j;1('l'

1

dj,f;111c·c·.

Tlw failurl's of 1\1 I. Olympus Rt'alty to fully inform and
11 pr1·•l'!lt it:-; principals has alrt'ady been set forth in d«tail,
, 11 pra tl111s gi1ing rist' to damages. Thl'sl' indud<' failur<' to
r1·ad tlw rntirc· Earnl'st
Receipt OVIT the t<'lcphorw or
111 1·11·n ('all it lo tlw dl'frndants' attl'ntion, failure to sl'nd a
ol' it or any other docum<'nl including tlw listing agrtT11w11I to tlw dl'fr11dants and failure to follmv instructions
01cr tlw tdcphonl'. Also, '.\It. ·Olympus <'XC<Tdl'd its
autlioril) hy purportedly accepting plaintiff's terms and
the Earrwst l\lotH'Y
this being a violatio11 of
11.- du tic.-_ Su('h du tit's arc emphasized by the lJ tah Supn·m<·
Court:
Bc·c'<lllS<' of the specialized service the real estate
broker offers in acting as an agent for his dicnt,
tlwrc arises a fiduciary relationship between them;
il is inrnmbent upon him to apply his abilities and
l-r:nou ledge to the advantage of the man he senJcs;
and lo make full disclosure of all facts which his
1irincipal should know in transacting the business.
Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P. 2d 410.
(l: tah Report p. 122) (Emphasis
1

POINT Vil
TllERE \\AS NO APPARENT AUTHORITY SO AS TO
Fl\D \ Bl;'-lDING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE DEFE\ D.\\TS AND THE PLAINTIFF.
\.

Thn<' wa:-; 110 written contract on June 3, l 969, to
lw pnformcd.
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As arg1wd in a pnor section of this Bri<'f. ,;upra.,
Point:-; IV and \ . thcrt' nevn was in t·xistt'lllT

011

.luni· ,

196'>. a writlt>n agreement to comply with tlw :-;lalut 1

"'

Frauds. or an Earrwst \loney
signed a,; requirPd Ii.
its own terms. Thcref ore. it is ,;trenuo11sly a,;scrtcd fl\ ti,,
defendanb that

doctrine of "apparent

·· \\utili:

not even come into play to hind the defendant:-; to an ag11 .,
mcnt with the plaintiff.
B.

There was no apparent authority to bind t\ 1,
defondants.

In granting a directed verdict, thf' evidence did

tllJI

establish" apparent authority" so as to bind the defrndanH,
an agreement with Alan Frandsen. This is the case nTn 1t.
arguendo, only, the Earnt>st Money Receipt purporle1lh
signt>d on June 4, l 969, is taken into consideration.
There is affirmative evidence which indicates that thr
plaintiff, Alan Frandsen, had knowledge on June

:t l 969. 111

a change in terms. Appellants were entitled to the bcndit 11!
this testimony imputing, in fact conveying expressly. kn1111
ledge to Frandsen of the altered terms, which in effect woulrl
constitute a counteroffer or in any event a suhstantial\I
different contract than the trial court ordered to be spel'ifil'al
ly performed. (See Point Ill, supra)
Besides the actual knowkdge of the plaintiff

111

what the defendants required, there was still no apparent
authoritv to bind the defendants. It is uncontrovcrted that
the

plaintiff, Alan

Frandsen, knew

that

Mt. OlymjJtt·

Realty, Inc., was acting as the agent of the ddt>ndanb
supra, (R. 273, 308-309). The authority of \lt. Olympu·
Realty was only that which was contained in the listing agrrr·
ment (Ex. P-1 ). Within the wording of this agency agrrrmcnt
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di" 1•11 s:·wd undn Point V, there is nothing to suggest that
\It. OI) rnp11,; Realty '"as given authority to ac('cpt any offn
and to "'"n1tc all) docum<'nb or writings so a:- to bind tlw
drfr11dants (Ex. P-1 ).
, _
1

dl'arl) the law that a party ''ho knowingly d<'als
11 ith an ag"nt as did the plaintiff is given th<' burden and
plarerl on inquiry to ascertain th1· ext<'nt of the authority of
tlw agl'nt with whom he is dealing. Dohrmann Hotd Supply
( 11 . u. Beau Brummel, Inc., 99 lJ tah 188, 103 P. 2d 650.
Urw deals with a known agent at his peril. Where there is any
doubt if ·' ... the acts of an agent under such a contract are
1vithin his delegated powers, they should be resolv<'d against
the ar,enl and against any third party dealin{!. with him
under the power . .. "Springer v. City Bank, supra, p. 255.
It

Th<'rt-' was no other writing on June 3, 1969, other than
thl' li:-ting
which could havl' been relied on by the
plaintiff to givt· any indication of authority to bind the defrndanh. Tht> plaintiff testified that he did not see a rnpy of
tlw telegram until about a week after receipt by John Hyde
(R. 300). Furthnmore, as argued in Point V, supra, it contairwd nothing about authority for Mt. Olympus to bind the
dt'frndants, was addressed to their agent, and as argued
FrandsPn had knowledge of a change.
Rq>r<':,w11tations by Mt. Olympus of authority to compltt1, this transaction and execute papers would not be binding
authority or apparent authority is not established by
tfw ag<'nt. hut by acts of his principal. There is absolutely
nu e1idrnc1· showing any communication from the defendants
dirrctl) to th<' plaintiff nor ratification by the defendants of
2111 1 of thc acts of \It. Olympus Realty which purportedly
bound the defendants to an agreement with the plaintiff.
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\Vht'n th<' tdegram
finalh n'<Ti\cd and altadl!'d 111 Ii,,
Earrw.-;t \lotl<') Rcn·ipl 011 ] u1w 4. 19(>9. this ,.;till did 1111 1 1,
any Wa) ddrad from th<' obligation of llw plaintitt 1,,
ascertain the authorit\• of th<' tTJl <'slat<· au_1·11t.-.;. for u.. , (I I•
cusst·d supra. Point \. tlw td<'gram ga\!' no clltll1orizalion t11 r
1·xc1·utio11. Tlwrc is nothing in the record to show an)
of inquiry taken by th<' plaintiff to ascertain authorit: for
himsdf. Tlwre is no evidence as to reliance on an\. thinv tu
justify specific
It is a,.;st'rtcd, then, that evcn if there could be a
that Frandsen did not have knowledge of the t:hangl' in
terms, the defendants would not be bound. Then' is no
in law for Frandsen to rdy on Mt. Olympus either b) 11hat
they did in oral conversation (Points IV & V) or in
ly <-'xt·cuting the Earnest Money Receipt so that the de
fendants would be bound. (Points IV & V).

POINT VIII
MT. OL Y"'1PUS REALTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
DIRECTED VERDICT AWARDING A COMMISSION.
After arguments on motions by respective counsel, the
lower court stated,
I find a contract is valid and to be
specifically performed, then automatically, thnc\; no othn
question for the jury as I see it. That's the ruling of the
court" (R. 463). h is apparent
that the dirt>t·trd
verdict in favor of Mt. Olympus for its real estate
was based upon what defrn<lant strongly has urged on rnani
grounds, supra, is a highly improper conclusion of law. that a
binding and enforceablt' agreement had been entered into
between the plaintiff and the defendants.
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:)inn· \It. 01) mpus Realty failt·d to product· a bu) er

as ready. willing and able to purchase th<· l\lillcreek
11111 011 the terms of the sellers, it is not 1·ntitl('d to a
-tall' 1·ornrnissio11, supra Points III. IV, V and \I.
11110

11

1

Fmthcrmorc, there is <'vid<·11ce that no transaction was
lo lw concluded or binding and thus no commissio11 until the
, 1·1krs approved the closing
which wcr<' to be
prqwfd and presented to them when the sellers arrived in
Salt Lake City. supra Point III, part B (R. 364, 332, 371,
1:-Hl-132).

As discussed in Point VI, Mt. Olympus Rt>alty violated
it' fidu('iary du tics. As stated by the lJ tah Supreme Court in
lht' ras<' of RPesr v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P. 2d 410, a
rl'al
broker is precluded from recovering services
n·ndrrl'd '' lwn it fails to discharge with reasonable dilig<'nce
and l'are the duties owed by a broker to his principal
(p. 1-12). Even assuming, arguendo only, that for some rt>ason
't1cl1 a' appan·ncy of authority, the defendants were bound
to plaintiff, thne was evidence that Mt. Olympus exceeded
it, authority thert'by precluding recovery for its commission
and, Ill fact, making it responsible for damages.
CONCLUSION

Thi· ddendants are entitled to have all evidence con·lrw·d in the light most favorable to them and to have all
' 0 11trovnt<·d facts decided in their favor. Accordingly, Mt.
Oh rnpus was solely and exclusively the agent of the defrndants in this transaction. The telegram sent to John T.
H> de ''as part of the communications between principals
aiid tlwir own agent, such being tantamount to a private comniunication. The tdegram was not a communication to the
plaintiff. and did not complete an agreement.
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Aftn '·filing", "posting" or sc11<ling th<' tclcgrarn. Iii,
defr11da11ts still had the power of rej1·ction and 1·ountnoff,,
and <'alll'd thl'ir age11t to give new instructions prior to 111,
time i\I t. Olympus Rl'alty contacted thl' plaintiff. In pr"par
ing dornmcnts for closing, l\lt. Olympus Realty <lid not f0 1J,, 1,
th1· dear instructions given to them, thus violating lhPtr
authority and fiduciary duties.
Pursuant to the terms of the Earnest 1\1 oncy Rt'!'l'ipl
this document had to be subscribed by the sellers before thm
would bt· any binding agreement. It was not so subscrilwdu 1
June 3, 1969. or at any time by the sellers an<l was not p111
portcdly signed for them until J unc 4, 1969. Ttwre \\a• nr

authority for i\I t. Olympus Realty to execute this d6curM11i
especially in light of the fact that the defendants had

110

knowledge that such a document even existed until tht· dr
fendants came to Salt Lake City nearly two weeh lalir.
There was no authority given to execute a document p111
suant to the Statute of Frauds.
There was no apparent authority so as to bind thr dr
fendants to the plaintiff since there was no properly ;uli
scribed contract on June 3. Furthermore, there is evidr11

11

that the plaintiff had timely knowledge of a change in tm1·
on June 3, 1969, and even without said knowledge\\
on

that he was dealing with an agent and did :-o a!

his own peril, with the burden of ascertaining authority.
Tht' defendants were not bound by an agreenH·nt to !hr
plaintiff for the reasons discussed under the Point,;. It 1'
respectfully submitted that as a matter of law the dirfcit•rJ
verdicts awarded bv the lower court should be
motions of

by the defendants should be granted anrl
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tliat tlw <·01111tcrclairn against the plaintiff and the claim
th<' third party defendant should be remanded for
liirtlwr prol'eedings.

In the alternative, it is submitted that

tlw dirert<'d verdicts should be reversed and the entire matter
.fi 1, 1dd lw rernandt'd for further proceedings.

K1·,prdfully submitted,

1. THO:VlAS GREENE and GIFFORD W. PRICE
1 <1!lI10n.

(;rccne & Nebeker

100 Kt>nnccott Building

'alt Lake City, lJ tah 84111
lllornrys for Appellants

